We give a generic construction for universal designated-verifier signature schemes from a large class, C, of signature schemes. The resulting schemes are efficient and have two important properties. Firstly, they are provably DV-unforgeable, non-transferable and also non-delegatable. Secondly, the signer and the designated verifier can independently choose their cryptographic settings. We also propose a generic construction for identity-based signature schemes from any signature scheme in C and prove that the construction is secure against adaptive chosen message and identity attacks. We discuss possible extensions of our constructions to hierarchical identity-based signatures, identity-based universal designated verifier signatures, and identitybased ring signatures from any signature in C. 
Introduction
Universal Designated-Verifier Signatures. Designated verifier proofs and designated verifier signatures (DVS) were proposed by Jakobsson et al. [JSI96] as proofs and signatures that will only convince a specific verifier. The idea is that such proofs/signatures can be constructed by both the prover/signer on one hand and the verifier on the other. When a verifier receives such a proof/signature, since he knows that he has not constructed it himself, he will be convinced. However the verifier cannot convince a third party by showing him what he has received, since it could have been the verifier himself who generated the designated proof/signature.
Universal designated-verifier signatures (UDVS) were first proposed by Steinfeld et al. [SBWP03] with the goal of protecting users' privacy when using certificates. In such a scheme, a user Alice has a certificate that is signed by a certificate issuer. If Alice wants to present her certificate to a verifier Bob, she will use Bob's public key to transform the issuer's signature into a designated signature for Bob. Bob can verify the issuer's signature by verifying the validity of the designated signature. However, he cannot convince a third party that the certificate was signed by the issuer, because he can use his secret key to construct the same designated signature.
Steinfeld et al. proposed security definitions for UDVS schemes and gave a concrete scheme based on bilinear group pairs [SBWP03] . In [LWB05] Lipmaa et al. argued that the original security definition in [SBWP03] did not sufficiently capture the verifier-designation property and introduced a new security notion, called nondelegatability. The authors showed that in some UDVS schemes including Steinfeld et al's [SBWP03] , the issuer can delegate his signing ability -with respect to a fixed designated verifier -to a third party, without revealing his secret key or even enabling the third party to sign with respect to other designated verifiers. They argue that, in many scenarios, such delegation property is undesirable and must be prevented.
As an example, consider the following scenario. A university uses a digital signature scheme to issue student cards. Alice, a student, wants to prove herself a student in a gym to get a discount. To protect her privacy, she converts the universitys signature on her card to a designated signature first and then presents the designated signature as a proof of studentship. Now if the UDVS in use is delegatable, the university, without having to issue a card for Alex, a non-student, will be able to publish a value that enables him (and anybody) to compute a designated signature for himself get the discount at the gym. This value does not enable Alex to compute university's private key, sign other documents on behalf of the university, or even compute a designated signature of the university to use other services. Besides, since the university has not actually issued any fraudulent student cards, it cannot be held responsible for any malicious activity. These two facts provide enough safety margin for the university to abuse such delegation ability.
None of the many UDVS schemes proposed to date, except a recent scheme of Huang et al. [HSMW06] , has treated non-delegatability as a security requirement. Furthermore, the results of Lipmaa et al. [LWB05] and later results of Li et al. [LLP05] show that many of the proposed UDVS schemes are delegatable, including the scheme from [SBWP03] and one of the schemes from [SWP04] .
Our Contributions on UDVS. We give a generic construction for secure UDVS schemes from a large class of signature schemes. The class is defined by requiring certain properties from signature schemes. We use a definition of security that includes the original security notions of Steinfled et al, i.e. unforgeability and nontransferability privacy, and also the notion of non-delegatability inspired by the work of Lipmaa et al. [LWB05] and adapted to UDVS. We define non-delegatability for a UDVS scheme by requiring a designated signature to be a 'proof of knowledge' of either a signature on the message or the designated verifier's secret key. This definition guarantees that only Alice or Bob are able to construct valid designated signatures, and hence they will cannot delegate this ability to others without revealing Alice's certificate or Bob's secret key.
To construct non-delegatable UDVS schemes, we will use Jakobsson et al's approach to providing verifier designation [JSI96] : "Instead of proving Θ, Alice will prove the statement: Either Θ is true, or I am Bob." In UDVS schemes, Alice wants to prove validity of her certificate to Bob. A natural construction of UDVS is a non-interactive version of a proof of the following statement by Alice: "Either my certificate is valid, or I am Bob." Such a signature can be constructed as follows: first pick a protocol for proof of knowledge of Alice's certificate and another for the proof of knowledge of Bob's secret key; then construct a protocol for proof of knowledge of Alices certificate or Bobs secret key by combining the two protocols via e.g. techniques of Cramer et al. [CDS94] ; finally make the resulting protocol non-interactive via e.g. Fiat-Shamir transform [FS86] . It is intuitively clear that such a construction yields a secure UDVS scheme, assuming both the underlying protocols are honest-verifier zero-knowledge (HVZK) proofs of knowledge. However, efficient protocols for HVZK proof of knowledge of a signature on a message are only known for a small group of signature schemes.
We propose a construction for UDVS schemes that works for any combination of a signature in class C of signature schemes and all verifier key pairs that belong to a class K, and prove its security in the above sense, in the Random Oracle Model (ROM) [BR93] . The class C of signatures that can be used in our construction includes signature schemes such as RSA-FDH [BR96] , Schnorr [Sch91] , modified ElGamal [PS00a] , BLS [BLS01] , BB [BB04] , Cramer-Shoup [CS00] , and both schemes proposed by Camenisch and Lysyanskaya [CL02, CL04] . Class K is the set of all key pairs for which there exist protocols for HVZK proofs of knowledge of the secret key corresponding to a public key and includes public and private key pairs of the RSA cryptosystem, GQ identification scheme [GQ88] , and discrete-log based public and private key pairs.
Our construction are generic and security proofs guarantee security of a large class of UDVS schemes that are obtained from standard signature schemes that are members of the class C. We note that the only other known non-delegatable UDVS due to Huang et al. [HSMW06] is in fact an instance of our construction. Furthermore, our construction does not limit the signer and the verifier to use compatible' schemes: the construction works for any choice of signer and verifier settings as long as the signature scheme is a member of class C and the verifier key belongs to the class K. All previous constructions only work for a specific combination of signature schemes and verifier key pairs.
Identity-Based Signatures. Identity-based cryptography was proposed by Shamir in [Sha84] , where he also proposed an identity-based signature (IBS) scheme. In an IBS scheme, there is an authority with a key pair: a master secret key and a master public key, who generates for each user a user secret key based on the user's identity. A user can use its user secret key to sign messages. Signatures can be verified against the identity of the signer and the master public key.
There are two known generic constructions of IBS. The first is due to Bellare et al. [BNN04] , which generalizes an earlier construction of Dodis et al. [DKXY03] . Bellare et al. show that a large number of previously proposed schemes are in fact instances of their generic construction. However, as noted by the authors, there are some IBS schemes, including Okamoto's discrete logarithm based IBS [Oka92] The other generic construction is the one of Kurosawa and Heng [KH04] . Their construction requires an efficient zero-knowledge protocol for proof of knowledge of a signature, which makes their construction applicable to only a few schemes such as RSA-FDH and BLS.
Our Contributions on IBS. We propose a construction of IBS schemes from any signature in the aforementioned class C and prove the construction secure against adaptive chosen message and identity attacks. In our construction, a user secret key is basically a signature of the authority on user's identity. An identity-based signature is generated as follows: the user constructs a proof of knowledge of her secret key (i.e. the authority's signature on her identity) and then transforms it into a signature on a message using the Fiat-Shamir transform. For signature schemes with efficient zero-knowledge protocols for proof of knowledge of a signature, our constructions will become the same as those of Kurosawa and Heng [KH04] . Thus, our constructions can be seen as a generalization of theirs.
Many previous IBS schemes can be seen as instances of our generic construction; this includes the schemes of Fiat and Shamir [FS86] , Guillou and Quisquater [GQ88] , Shamir [Sha84] , pairing-based schemes from [SOK00, Hes02, CC03, Yi03, BLMQ05, HCW05] and basically all the convertible IBS schemes constructed in [BNN04] . Both OkDL-IBS and BNN-IBS, which are not captured by generic constructions of Bellare et al, fit as instances of our generic construction as well. However, all the IBS schemes that we construct are proved secure in ROM. Thus ROM-free constructions such as the folklore certificate-based IBS schemes formalized in [BNN04] and the scheme of Paterson and Schuldt [PS06] are not captured by our framework.
Further Contributions. We observe that our identity-based constructions support a nesting-like property in the sense that a user can act as a new key generation authority and issue keys for other users. This fact enables extensions of our IBS constructions to hierarchical identity-based signatures out of any signature scheme in the class C. We will also point out the possibility of generic constructions of (non-delegatable) identity-based universal designated verifier signatures and identity-based ring signatures from any signature in C using our techniques.
Related Work
UDVS schemes were first proposed by Steinfeld et al. in [SBWP03] . They also proposed security definitions and a concrete scheme based on bilinear group pairs. In [SWP04] , authors proposed extensions of Schnorr and RSA signatures to UDVS schemes. Other pairing-based schemes were proposed in [ZFI05] and [Ver06] Our constructions are very close to Goldwasser and Waisbard's generic constructions of designated confirmer signatures in [GW04] . They also use protocols for proof of knowledge of a signature as a tool for their constructions. They also present such protocols for a number of signature schemes including Goldwasser-Micali-Rivest [GMR88], Gennaro-Halevi-Rabin [GHR99] , and Cramer-Shoup [CS00] . This shows that the above signatures are in class C.
A closely related area is that of ring signatures. Generic constructions of ring signatures as Fiat-Shamir transformed proofs of knowledge of one-out-of-n secret keys have been known for some time now. Our techniques deal with the similar but different concept of proofs of knowledge of signatures on known messages. Although protocols for proof of knowledge of a secret key corresponding to a public key are more studied and well-known, protocols for proof of knowledge of a signature on a message with respect to a known public key has been less studied.
Our identity-based signature is actually an instance of a more general concept: signatures of knowledge, recently redefined and formalized by Chase and Lysyanskaya [CL06] . A signature of knowledge on a message guarantees that a signer who knows a witness of an NP language has signed the message. Having defined such a signature, conventional signatures become instances of this definition, where a signature guarantees that a signer who knows the secret key corresponding to a known public key has signed the message. Our identity-based signature is also an instance of a signature of knowledge, in which a signature guarantees that a signer who knows a signature of the key generating authority on his identity, has signed the message.
Our identity-based signature can also be seen as the signature counterpart of hidden credentials [HBSO03] . In a hidden credential scheme, Alice encrypts a message in a way that Bob can only decrypt it if he has a certain credential from Chris, i.e. the credential acts as the private decryption key. In our identity-based signatures, Bob receives a signature which guarantees that an entity who has a certain credential from Chris has signed it, i.e. the credential acts as the private signing key.
It is worth noting that the previous construction of identity-based universal designated verifier signature scheme by Zhang et al. [ZSMC05] is delegatable. Our generic construction of the above scheme, as mentioned before, guarantee non-delegatability.
Preliminaries

Notation
We use different fonts to denote Algorithms, security notions, and Oracles, respectively. We denote the internal state of an algorithm X by St X and the empty string by ε. and denote concatenation and definition, respectively. We will also use a handful of different arrows to denote different actions. These are summarized in Table 1 . where the prover proves knowledge of her secret Sec corresponding to a publicly known P ub, s.t. (P ub, Sec) ∈ Rel. Technically speaking, Sec is the private input to the prover algorithm and P ub is the public input of the protocol. We will follow the convention that all the secret inputs are collectively denoted by Sec and shown before the colon (:) and all the remaining variables, functions, sets, etc. appearing after the colon are assumed to be the public inputs, collectively denoted by P ub.
A public-coin protocol is a protocol in which the verifier chooses all its messages during the protocol run randomly from publicly-known sets. A three-move public-coin protocol can be written in the so called canonical form as shown in Figure 1 . The prover algorithm in this case will consist of a pair of algorithms, respectively for so-called committing and responding, denoted by P = (Cmt, Rsp). The verifier algorithm, in turn, will consist of a pair of algorithms, respectively for so-called challenging and deciding, denoted by V = (Chl, Dcd), where the challenging algorithm is limited to only drawing a challenge randomly from a publicly-known set, called the challenge space.
As we mentioned before, we will denote by St P the internal state of the prover. The work-flow of the algorithm is as follows. In the first move, the prover runs the algorithm Cmt to compute the commitment Cmt and sends it to the verifier. Then the verifier chooses a random challenge Chl from a challenge space ChSp and sends it back in the second move. The prover will then compute a response Rsp according to the algorithm Rsp based on the information from the first run and the challenge, and then send Rsp to the verifier. Algorithm Dcd will be run by the verifier at the end to compute a decision d based on the commitment, the challenge and the response.
Figure 1: A canonical three-move public-coin protocol for proof of knowledge Let's denote the transcript of a protocol run in Figure 1 by T r = (Cmt, Chl, Rsp). The protocol is said to have the honest-verifier zero-knowledge property (HVZK from now on) [GMR89] , if there exists an algorithm that is able to simulate transcripts that are indistinguishable from the ones of the real protocol runs without the knowledge of the secret. The protocol is said to have the special soundness property (SpS from now on) as described in [CDS94] , if there also exists an algorithm that is able to extract the secret from two transcripts of the protocol with the same commitment and different challenges. We denote these as the following, respectively:
T r ← TrSim (P ub) and Sec ← Ext (P ub, T r, T r ) , where T r = (Cmt, Chl, Rsp) and T r = (Cmt , Chl , Rsp ) are such that Cmt = Cmt but Chl = Chl . A threemove public-coin protocol with both the HVZK and SpS properties is usually called a Σ protocol. Examples of Σ protocols for proof of knowledge are the GQ protocol [GQ88] and the Schnorr protocol [Sch91] .
Proofs of Disjunctive Knowledge
Cramer et al. have shown how to extend Σ protocols to witness indistinguishable (WI from now on) Σ protocols for proving knowledge of (at least) t out of n values using secret sharing schemes [CDS94] . They call such protocols proofs of partial knowledge. Witness indistinguishability guarantees that even a cheating verifier will not be able to tell which t-subset of the n values the prover knows. Thus, the transcripts of different runs of the protocol with different t-subsets as prover input will be indistinguishable from one another.
An instance of such partial proofs of knowledge that we find useful here is a WI proof of knowledge of one out of two, which we call a proof of disjunctive knowledge. These proofs were also observed by Camenisch and Stadler [CS97b] for discrete logarithms. In line with the above, we will use the following notation to show such proofs: to show a protocol for proof of knowledge of a value Sec 1 such that Rel 1 (P ub 1 , Sec 1 ) or a value Sec 2 such that Rel 2 (P ub 2 , Sec 2 ), we use the notation
The Σ protocol for proof of knowledge of Sec 1 or Sec 2 corresponding to P ub = (P ub 1 , P ub 2 ) can be constructed in the canonical form using simple techniques. Both HVZK and SpS properties are also inherited by the constructed proof of disjunctive knowledge. For specifics refer to Appendix F.
The Fiat-Shamir Transform
Fiat and Shamir proposed a method for transforming (interactive) three-move public-coin protocols into noninteractive schemes [FS86] . The idea is to replace the verifier with a hash function and the rationale behind it is that all the verifier does in such a protocol is providing some sort of unpredictable challenge that can be mimicked by a Random Oracle hash function. This idea can be applied in two different ways, depending on what one includes in the hash function argument. One way is to set the challenge as the hash of the concatenation of the public inputs and the commitment, i.e. Chl ← H (P ub Cmt). This way we will get a non-interactive proof of knowledge. If such a transform is applied to the protocol in Figure 1 using the Random Oracle hash function H : {0, 1} * → ChSp, the resulting non-interactive proof scheme will be as in Figure 2 , with the algorithms NIPoK and NIVoK for non-interactive proof and verification of knowledge, respectively. Here, π is a non-interactive proof that can be verified off-line and publicly. HVZK and SpS properties for non-interactive proofs are defined similarly to their counterparts for interactive proofs. Pointcheval and Stern's Forking Lemma [PS00a] can be used to easily prove in the Random Oracle Model that the Fiat-Shamir construction has both the HVZK and SpS properties if the original interactive proof has the corresponding properties.
Figure 2: The non-interactive proof scheme from applying Fiat-Shamir to the protocol in Figure 1 The other way of applying the Fiat-Shamir method is to set the challenge as the hash of the concatenation of the public inputs, the commitment, and an arbitrary message m, i.e. Chl ← H (P ub Cmt m). This will give us a signature scheme. The resulting signature from applying such a transform to the protocol in Figure 1 using the Random Oracle hash function H : {0, 1} * → ChSp, will be as in Figure 3 , with the algorithms Sign and Verify for signing a message and verification of a candidate signature, respectively. Similarly, σ is a signature that can be verified publicly. The resulting signature scheme will be existentially unforgeable under chosen message attack if the original protocol is a Σ protocol [PS00a] . Security of the signature can be also proved assuming other requirements [OO98] or even weaker requirements on the protocol [AABN02] . We do not get into those details since we are not going to use those results directly.
The term signature of knowledge has been used in the literature for a transformed proof of knowledge via the Fiat-Shamir transform, dating back to Camenisch and Stadler's work on group signatures [CS97a] . Let us also
Figure 3: The signature scheme from applying Fiat-Shamir to the protocol in Figure 1 use the terms signature of knowledge (SoK) for both the NIPoK and Sign algorithms and the term verification of knowledge (VoK) for both the NIVoK and Verify algorithms, resulting from applying Fiat-Shamir transform to a Σ protocol as mentioned above. Assuming the original protocol to be PoK {Sec : Rel (P ub, Sec)}, we denote the corresponding SoK and VoK by
SoK {Sec : Rel (P ub, Sec)} = NIPoK (P ub, Sec)
VoK {Sec : Rel (P ub, Sec)} (m, σ) = Verify (P ub, m, σ) .
On Public-Private Key Pairs
Key pairs are usually generated via a key generation algorithm KeyGen that takes a security parameter as input and outputs the key pair. It must be hard to compute the secret key corresponding to a given public key. We call the hard problem of computing the secret key for a given public key for a key pair the underlying problem of that key pair. Each public key is an instance of the underlying problem and the corresponding secret key is the corresponding solution. If key pairs are poly-time verifiable, i.e. one can efficiently verify if a given secret key corresponds to a given public key, the key generation algorithm KeyGen defines an NP relation KeyP air consisting of all the possible key pairs, i.e.
We are interested in key pairs for which there exists a Σ protocol to prove knowledge of a secret key corresponding to a given public key. Let us call the set of these key pairs K. A Σ protocol for a key pair in K, omitting the security parameter (where it is clear from the context), can be shown as
PoK {sk : KeyPair (pk, sk)} .
Some key pairs that have Σ protocols as above are listed in Appendix C.1. These include popular key pairs like the ones of the GQ identification scheme, discrete-log-like key pairs, and key pairs of the RSA cryptosystem. We will use the term key type to refer to these different types of keys. For instance, we denote the keys for the GQ identification scheme by the term 'GQ-type key pairs'.
Note that (Ins, Sol), (P ub, Sec), and (pk, sk) are three ways of showing the same thing, i.e. a member of an NP relation, depending on how we are looking at the pair. We will use this intuition later to interchange notation between NP problems, proofs of knowledge and key pairs.
Defining the Class C of Signatures
Let SS = SS. (KeyGen, Sign, Verify) be a provably-secure (standard) signature scheme. Security of the scheme, i.e. its existential unforgeability under chosen message attacks (euf-cma) [GMR88] , is based on the hardness of an underlying problem denoted here by P SS . Let us also denote by P KSp and M Sp the public key space (i.e. the set of all possible public keys) and the message space of a standard signature scheme, respectively. We define a class C of standard signature schemes as follows.
Definition. C is the set of all signature schemes SS for which there exists a pair of algorithms, Convert and Retrieve, where Convert gets the public key pk, a message m, and a valid signature σ on the message as input and converts the signature to a pairσ = (σ aux ,σ pre ) called converted signature as follows:
• there exists an algorithm AuxSim such that for every pk ∈ P KSp and m ∈ M Sp the output of AuxSim (pk, m) is (information-theoretically) indistinguishable fromσ aux ,
• there exists an algorithm Compute that on input the public key pk, a message m, andσ aux computes a description of a one-way function f (·) and an I in the range of f , such that I is the image ofσ pre under the one-way function f , i.e. for a converted signature the output of the following algorithm is true.
• there exists a Σ protocol for proof of knowledge of a Sec =σ pre corresponding to a P ub = (pk, m,σ aux ) such thatσ is valid with respect to pk and m, i.e. there exist a Σ protocol for the following proof of knowledge PoK {σ pre : Valid (pk, m, (σ aux ,σ pre ))} , and for any candidate converted signature satisfying Valid (pk, m, (σ aux ,σ pre )), a valid signature on the message m can be retrieved via the Retrieve algorithm as follows:
The properties required by the definition enables a holder of a signature to efficiently prove knowledge of a signature on a known message to a verifier by first converting it and then revealing the simulatable part of the converted signature which enables the verifier to determine I and f . Finally, the protocol for proof of knowledge of the pre-image of I under f is carried out by the two parties. A similar property for signature schemes have been observed before in the literature, often referred to as the reduction of the proof of knowledge of a signature to a proof of knowledge of a pre-image under a one-way function (see e.g. [ASW00, CD00, GMY06]). Note that the fact that any NP relation has a Σ protocol [CDV06] provides protocols for proving knowledge of a signature for any signature scheme, but such protocols are not necessarily efficient enough for practice. We observe that even existence of a Σ protocol for a converted version of the signature is enough for our constructions. Such a protocol is not necessarily HVZK with respect to the signature since it revealsσ aux .
We actually need another requirement on the signature scheme to be able to prove our schemes secure. We require that in the security proof of the signature scheme, two separate algorithms be identifiable: an algorithm that given an instance Ins of the underlying problem P SS , is able to simulate for the adversary a public key and signatures on the messages of its choice, and a second algorithm that given a forgery by the adversary (resp. two forgeries on the same message for schemes with proof of unforgeability based on the Forking Lemma), is able to calculate the solution Sol to the problem instance. We will call these two algorithms Sim and Cal, respectively. Since, this is true for all the conventional signature schemes, we do not see it as a real requirement. For more on this extra requirement, see Appendix C.2. 
Universal Designated Verifier Signatures
In this section, we first review the definitions of the UDVS scheme and its security. Then we propose our generic construction of UDVS schemes from any signature scheme in C and prove it secure.
Definition
A UDVS is a signature scheme with an extra functionality: a holder of a signature can designate the signature to a particular verifier, using the verifier's public key. A UDVS can be described by adding some extra algorithms to the ones needed for description of the underlying signature scheme. Here, we briefly recall the definitions from Steinfeld et al. [SBWP03] . A UDVS is described by eight algorithms: a Common Parameter Generation algorithm CPGen that on input 1 k , where k is the security parameter, outputs a string consisting of common parameters cp publicly shared by all users, two Signer (resp. Verifier) Key Generation algorithms SKeyGen (resp. VKeyGen) that on input a common parameter string cp, output a secret/public key-pair (sk s , pk s ) (resp. (sk v , pk v )) for the signer (resp. verifier), Signing and Public Verification algorithms Sign and PVer, where the former on input a signing secret key sk s and a message m, outputs a signer's publicly-verifiable (PV) signature σ and the latter on input signer's public key pk s and message/PV-signature pair (m, σ), outputs a boolean verification decision, Designation and Designated Verification algorithms Desig and DVer, where the former on input a signer's public key pk s , a verifier's public key pk v , and a message/PV-signature pair (m, σ), outputs a designated-verifier (DV) signatureσ and the latter on input a signer's public key pk s , a verifier's secret key sk v , and a message/DV-signature pair (m,σ), outputs a boolean verification decision, and finally a Verifier Key-Registration VKeyReg algorithm, which is a protocol between a Key Registration Authority (KRA) and a verifier to register verifier's public key.
Security
Steinfeld et al. identified two security requirements for UDVS schemes: DV-unforgeability and non-transferability privacy. We consider a third property proposed by Lipmaa et al. called non-delegatability. Intuitively, DVunforgeability captures the inability of the adversary to forge designated signatures for new messages, even if it can have signatures on chosen messages and can verify chosen pairs of messages and designated signatures, non-transferability privacy captures the inability of the designated verifier to produce evidence to convince a third party that the message has actually been signed by the signer, and finally non-delegatability captures the inability of everyone except the signature holder and the designated verifier to generate designated signatures and hence the signature holder and designated verifier's inability to delegate their ability to generate designated signatures without revealing their corresponding secrets, i.e. the signature or the designated verifier secret key.
DV-Unforgeability. We use Steinfeld et als definition of security of UDVS schemes against existential designated signature unforgeability under chosen message attack, denoted by dv-euf-cma-attack. The formal definition comes in Appendix D.
Non-Transferability Privacy. Steinfeld et al. have formalized this property in detail and proposed a definition capturing the fact that possessing a designated signature does not add to the computational ability of the designated verifier [SBWP03] . In their formalization, they require that whatever a designated verifier who has been given a designated signature can leak to a third party (even at the expense of disclosing his secret key), he would have been able to leak without the designated signature. One can easily see that if designated signatures are simulatable by the verifier himself then a designated signature adds no computational ability to the verifier and thus, without going into details of the formal definition for non-transferability privacy, we will state and use the following lemma to prove our schemes secure.
Lemma 1 A scheme UDVS achieves perfect non-transferability privacy if there exists an efficient forgery algorithm Forge, s.t. for any pairs (sk s , pk s ) and (sk v , pk v ) generated through key generation algorithms of UDVS and for any message m, the following two random variables have the same distribution:
Other flavors of non-transferability privacy, i.e. statistical and computational non-transferability privacy can be analogously achieved by requiring the two distributions to be statistically or computationally indistinguishable, respectively. Note that there are two main differences between this lemma and Lemma 1 in [SBWP03, p. 531]. Firstly, their lemma is biconditional, but ours is not. We are only using the direction that is pretty obvious. However, our lemma is a generalization of that direction. They only state their lemma for deterministic designated signatures, but our lemma is stated for the general (possibly probabilistic) case.
Non-Delegatability. Lipmaa et al have defined the non-delegatability property for designated-verifier signatures [LWB05] . As they mention, their definition of κ-non-delegatability basically requires the designated signature to be a non-interactive proof of knowledge of the signer's or the designated verifier's secret key, with knowledge error κ as per definition of [BG92] . The reason behind such a definition is to guarantee that only the signer or the designated verifier are able to produce a designated signature, thus preventing them from being able to delegate their ability without revealing their secret key. In a UDVS scheme, we want only a person who holds a signature or the designated verifier to be able to produce a designated signature. Lipmaa et al's definition can be extended to the UDVS case as follows. κ-non-delegatability for UDVS schemes requires the designated signature to be a non-interactive proof of knowledge of a signature or the designated verifier's secret key, with knowledge error κ.
We use an observation by Cramer et al. [CDM00, p. 359 ], that will help us simplify the non-delegatability proofs for our constructions, is that a three-move public-coin protocol with SpS property and challenge space ChSp is a proof of knowledge with knowledge error κ = |ChSp| −1 . The non-interactive version of this observation can be easily seen to hold in the Random Oracle Model using the Forking Lemma. That is, a Fiat-Shamir noninteractive proof of knowledge (i.e. our NIPoK) with SpS property and challenge space ChSp is a non-interactive κ-proof of knowledge in the the Random Oracle Model with knowledge error κ = |ChSp| −1 . Based on these observations, we propose the following lemma:
Lemma 2 A scheme UDVS is κ-non-delegatable if a designated signature is a Fiat-Shamir non-interactive proof of knowledge of a signature or the secret key of the verifier, with SpS property and |ChSp| ≥ 
Construction of UDVS Schemes from Standard Signatures
We show how to extend any signature scheme in class C to a universal designated verifier signature, by combining it with a key type for the verifier in K. We use the building blocks we introduced before, namely proofs of disjunctive knowledge and the Fiat-Shamir transforms to construct our UDVS schemes. As mentioned before, our construction has the distinctive property that the verifier's key pair type can be chosen independently from the choice of the signer's signature. Our construction works for any combination of a signature in class C and a verifier key pair type in K. Let SS = (KeyGen, Sign, Verify) be a standard signature scheme in class C and KT be a verifier-chosen key type in K. Denoting the signer-and verifier-related variables respectively by s and v indexes, the construction can be shown as follows:
• CPGen gets as input 1 k , where k is the security parameter, returns cp = 1 k as the common parameter. The signer and the verifiers choose their own signature scheme and key pair types, respectively, i.e.
GUDVS. (SKeyGen, Sign, PVer) = SS. (KeyGen, Sign, Verify) and VKeyGen = KeyGen .
• To designate, the signature-holder first converts the signature and then constructs a signature of disjunctive knowledge ofσ pre or the verifier's secret key. The DV-signature is a pair consisting ofσ aux and this signature of knowledge, i.e.
• To verify the DV-signature, one verifies the validity of the signature of knowledge δ according to the message, the public keys of the signer and the verifier, and the valueσ aux provided, i.e.
An example for an all-RSA-based scheme, which combines RSA-FDH signature and GQ-type verifier keys is described in Appendix E.
Note that the designated verification algorithm in our construction is public, since from the verifier key pair, only the public key pk v is sufficient to run the GUDVS.DVer algorithm. In fact, the definition of UDVS schemes does not require that designated verification should be only executable by the verifier and for instance, the SchUDVS 2 and RSAUDVS schemes from [SWP04] have public designated verification schemes. However, some authors have proposed a notion of privacy of signer identity in UDVS schemes that requires an only-verifier-executable designated verification [LV04] . In the same work, the authors show that if the designated signature is encrypted by the designator under an ind-cca encryption and then sent to the verifier, then it will be verifiable only by the verifier and the scheme will preserve privacy of signer identity.
Security Analysis for the Construction
DV-Unforgeability. We use the Forking Lemma to prove DV-Unforgeability of our generic UDVS construction. The Forking Lemma was originally proposed by Pointcheval and Stern [PS00a] . Recently, Bellare and Neven proposed a general version of the Forking Lemma in [BN06] . We use the results and formulations from the latter in our proof. For completeness, we have transcribed the general Forking Lemma that we use in Appendix G. Basically, our SoK-type constructions guarantees the ability to extract a signature or the verifier's secret key from a DV-forger through forking. The extracted signature or secret key is later used to solve the underlying problem of the signature scheme or that of the verifier key pair, respectively. Thus, given a successful DV-forger, we will be able to solve at least one of the above underlying problems and we have the following theorem. The proof is given in Appendix A.
Theorem 1 Let SS be a standard signature in C and P SS be its underlying problem. Also, let KT be a key type in K and P KT be its underlying problem. The construction GUDVS based on the combination of the signature SS and the verifier key-type KT is DV-unforgeable if P SS and P KT are both hard.
Non-Transferability Privacy. Non-transferability privacy for our generic UDVS schemes is due to the very concept behind our construction. Our designated signatures consist of publicly-simulatable values ofσ aux and witness indistinguishable signatures of knowledge of a valid converted signature or the verifier's secret key, both forgeable by the designated verifier himself indistinguishably from the real designated signatures. To forge a designated signature, the verifier will first simulateσ aux via the algorithm AuxSim and then, similar to the prover, he will be able to construct a non-interactive proof of disjunctive knowledge ofσ pre or the verifier's secret key (knowing the latter, of course). The forged designated signature will be consisting of the simulatedσ aux along with this signature of knowledge, i.e. we have the following forge algorithm:
AuxSim's ability to simulateσ aux and witness indistinguishability of the signature of knowledge will together imply that the output of the algorithm GUDVS.Forge is indistinguishable from real designated signatures. The existence of AuxSim and a Σ protocol for proof of knowledge of a converted signature is guaranteed if SS belongs to C. Furthermore, the existence of a Σ protocol for proof of knowledge of the verifier secret key is guaranteed if KT belongs to K. Thus, GUDVS.Forge will be successful in forging designated signatures for any combination of a signature in C and a verifier key type in K. Combining this with Lemma 1, we will have the following theorem.
Theorem 2 The construction GUDVS achieves non-transferability privacy for any combination of a signature in C and a verifier key type in K.
Non-Delegatability. The very design of our UDVS construction is naturally geared to provide non-delegatability through the use of signatures of knowledge. However, to meet the requirements of Lemma 2, we must first prove that a designated signature in our scheme is a signatures of knowledge of a signature or the secret key of the verifier with SpS property. All we know now is that a designated signature in our scheme consists of aσ aux and a signature of knowledge ofσ pre or the secret keys of the verifier with both HVZK and SpS properties.
One can easily see that a designated signature (σ aux , δ) as a signature of knowledge has the SpS property in the Random Oracle Model. The reason is that two designated signatures with the same first-move message (i.e. Random Oracle query, which includesσ aux along with the commitment) and different challenges (i.e. Random Oracle responses) will provide two δs with the same commitment and different challenges, which in turn, will give us the secret, i.e.σ pre or sk v . If the former is given, then one can retrieve a valid signature by running the Retrieve algorithm on input (σ aux ,σ pre ). Thus, two designated signatures with the same Random Oracle query and different Random Oracle responses will give us a signature or the verifier's secret key. Hence, the designated signature will have the SpS property as well and by Lemma 2 we will have the following theorem:
Theorem 3 The construction GUDVS is κ-non-delegatable for any combination of a signature in C and a verifier key type in K for which |ChSp| ≥ 1 κ .
Note that although a designated signature is an HVZK signature of knowledge of aσ pre or the verifier's public key, it is not an HVZK signature of knowledge of a signature or the verifier's public key, since it revealsσ aux which might include some information about the signature. However, Lemma 2 does not require the designated signature to have the HVZK property.
Comparison
We use constructions in [SBWP03, SWP04] as benchmarks for our constructions. We choose instances of our constructions that match the signature scheme and verifier key type of the benchmark schemes. Similar to [SWP04] , we assume the cost of computing a product a x · b y · c z and that of O(α) low exponent exponentiations are both equivalent to a single exponentiation. We also use the same typical parameters for lengths of members of different groups in use, namely 1.024 kb for DL groups and RSA modules and 0.16 kb for ChSp. To further simplify the comparison, we only consider the dominant term for the costs of computation assuming that a pairing (pair.)
an exponentiation (exp.) a multiplication (mult.) an addition, with " " standing for "costs (much) more than". We note that designation of a certain certificate can be performed in two phases: before choosing the designated verifier and after that and so computations can be carried out in two phases accordingly. We use the terms off-line and on-line to denote the two phases, respectively. An interesting property of our constructions is that cost of the on-line phase of designation is relatively very low (one multiplication). This makes our constructions desirable for the systems in which certificates are often needed to be verified by (and hence designated to) multiple different verifiers. Table 2 summarizes our comparisons, with "Typ." and "NDeleg." standing for "Typical" and "Non-Delegatability", respectively and comparatively more desirable values in bold. As the table shows, our schemes generally have more (yet comparable) costs of off-line designation and designated verification and result in longer designated signatures. However, our schemes have less on-line designation cost and provide provable non-delegatability. Our schemes are also (almost) generic and provide the desirable property of signer-verifier setting independence.
Note that, as a side effect of using the Forking Lemma for proof of security, our security reductions are not tight. It is possible to get tighter security results using the method proposed by Fischlin [Fis05] instead of Fiat-Shamir transform to make the interactive proofs non-interactive. However Fischlin's method will produce much longer signatures of knowledge. In this section, we first review the definitions of the IBS scheme and its security. Then we propose our generic construction of IBS schemes from any signature scheme in C and prove it secure.
Definition and Security
Identity-based cryptosystems were proposed by Shamir [Sha84] to overcome the problem of lack of public-key infrastructure which the public-key cryptosystems face. In such systems, public-key certificates are no longer needed, and the identities of the users are used as their public keys. However, users lose their ability to construct their own secret keys by themselves and must depend on a key-generation center (KGC) to provide them with their respective private keys.
An identity-based signature is a tuple of four algorithms as follows: a master key generation algorithm MKeyGen, which on input a security parameter k outputs a pair of master secret key and master public key (msk, mpk), a user key generation algorithm UKeyGen, which on input a master secret key msk and a user identity id, outputs a user secret key usk, a signing algorithm Sign, which on input a user secret key usk and a message m, outputs a signature σ on the message, and finally a verification algorithm Verify, which on input a master public key mpk, a user identity id, and a pair (m, σ), outputs a binary decision indicating whether or not σ is a valid signature on m with respect to mpk and id.
We use Bellare and Neven's definition for the security of an IBS scheme [BNN04] against existential unforgeability under a chosen message and identity attack, denoted by id-euf-cma-attack. This definition comes in Appendix D.
Generic Construction of IBS and Its Security
In this section we show how to extend any signature in C to an IBS scheme. The idea is to use the key pair generated for the signature scheme as the master key pair and use the signing algorithm as the user key generation in the following way: to generate a user secret key for an identity, the identity is signed and the signature on the identity is given to the user as the user secret key. Now, the user is able to prove her identity, since she can prove knowledge of a converted signature on her identity. The Fiat-Shamir transform can be used to transform this proof into a signature scheme. The resulting signature would be an identity-based signature.
The concrete description of the generic construction is as follows. Suppose that the standard signature SS = (KeyGen, Sign, Verify) is in C. The generic IBS scheme GIBS is constructed as follows:
To generate a master key pair, the KCG runs the key generation algorithm of the signature scheme and outputs the generated public/secret key pair as the master public/secret key pair. To generate a user key pair, the KCG simply signs the identity of the user using his master secret key and outputs the generated signature coupled with the master public key and the identity of the user as the user secret key, i.e.
An identity-based signature is constructed as a signature of knowledge of KGC's signature on the identity of the signer by first converting corresponding conversion algorithm on input σ (which is contained in the user secret key of the signer) to obtain (σ aux ,σ pre ). Then she constructs a proof of knowledge ofσ pre and transforms it into a signature of knowledge on m via the Fiat-Shamir transform. The signature is a pair consisting ofσ aux and this signature of knowledge. Finally, to verify an identity-based signature σ, one verifies the validity of the signature of knowledge δ according to the identity of the signer, the master public key, and the valueσ aux provided, i.e.
This construction is a generalized version of Kurosawa and Heng's construction [KH04] . They need stronger requirements on their signature schemes. It is also worth mentioning similarities between the idea behind Kurosawa and Heng's and our constructions and that of Naor's observation on how to transform any identitybased encryption to a standard signature scheme [BF01, p. 226]: in both, user secret keys are seen as the signature of the KGC on the user identity and vice versa. Our constructions can be seen as the other way of Naor's observation, i.e. from the non-identity-based world to the identity-based world. A possible result of combining the two ideas is the construction of identity-based signatures from identity-based encryptions.
We propose the following theorem for the security of our construction. A sketch of the proof is given in Appendix B.
Theorem 4 Let SS be a standard signature in C and P SS be its underlying problem. The construction GIBS based on the signature SS is id-euf-cma-secure if P SS is hard.
Further Constructions
We observe that the above construction of generic IBS schemes has kind of a nesting property, meaning that if one extends the definition of class C to identity-based signature schemes, then the construction GIBS will belong to the class C itself. This is due the fact that a GIBS signature in the form σ = (σ aux , (Cmt, Rsp)) can be converted to the converted signature bellow:
For all the signatures listed in Appendix C.3, knowledge of Rsp can be proved via a Σ protocol. Hence, for all the constructions of IBS schemes from these signatures, the GIBS can be nested in the way that an identity based signer can act as a new KGC for a new user. This enables construction of hierarchical identity-based signature schemes [GS02] .
An extension of our GIBS construction that stems from the nesting property is the construction of identity-based universal designated verifier signatures (IBUDVS) from any signature in C. In such a scheme, a designator wishes to designate a certificate signed by an identity-based signer and the designated verifier is also identity-based. The designated verifier's secret key is a signature on his identity by the KGC. To designate, the designator will simply construct a disjunctive proof of knowledge of (a converted version of) her certificate or (a converted version of) the verifier's secret key. Proofs of security of the scheme can be constructed by combining the ideas used to prove the generic UDVS and IBS schemes secure.
Another possible extension of the GIBS schemes is the construction of identity-based ring signatures from any signature scheme in C. To generate a ring signature, the signer will construct a one-out-of-n signature of knowledge of the n user secret keys in the chosen ring, where each user secret key is a signature of the KGC on the corresponding user identity.
Concluding Remarks
We have proposed generic constructions of UDVS and IBS schemes for a large class of signatures. Our constructions result in schemes with comparable cost and size to those of their counterparts. Our generic UDVS constructions are provably non-delegatable and also offer a signer-verifier setting independence feature. Many IBS schemes can be seen as instances of our generic IBS construction. It is possible to use our techniques to construct generic hierarchical identity-based signatures, identity-based universal designated verifier signatures, and identity-based ring signatures.
A Proof of Theorem 1
Proof. Let GUDVS be a UDVS scheme constructed via our constructions from a signature scheme SS in C and a verifier key pair type KT in K. Let also the underlying hard problem of the signature scheme be P SS and the underlying hard problem of the verifier key pair type be P KT . Given a DV-forger A and two instances of the problems P SS and P KT , we will show that at least one of the problem instances can be solved.
We will show how to construct, given a DV-forger A, two solver algorithms Slv KT and Slv SS for solving P KT and P SS instances, respectively. We will also show that at least one of these two strategies will succeed in solving its given instance of the problem, if the DV-forger manages to forge successfully. Given a successful DV-forger A, Slv KT will succeed only if the forgery produced by the A is of a certain type which is defined by an event. We also show that Slv SS succeeds if the DV-forger A is successful and another event occurs. Furthermore, we will show that the events above cover the universe. It follows that, with the above two solvers, given a DV-forger for GUDVS scheme , at least one of them will solve the associated problem.
We will construct our solvers in a modular way. We will introduce four algorithms Sim KT , Sim SS , Cal KT , and Cal SS and use these four algorithms along with the adversary A and the Bellare-Neven forker algorithm (see Appendix G) as modules of constructing the two solvers. We will construct the solver Slv KT as follows:
• the simulator algorithm Sim KT will run A as a subroutine, simulating the attack environment (inputs and answers to queries) for A, and obtain a DV-forgery from A,
• the forker algorithm Frk KT will run Sim KT as a subroutine, forking inputs to it, and obtain two different designated signatures from it, and
• the solution calculator algorithm Cal KT will run Frk KT as a subroutine and use the two designated signatures output by it to solve the given instance of the problems P KT .
The solver Slv SS is also constructed in a similar way, using algorithms Sim SS , Frk SS , and Cal SS . The algorithms Sim SS and Cal SS , in turn, run the Sim and Cal algorithms of the signature scheme SS, respectively. These algorithms are defined in Appendixes C.2 and C.3. The forker algorithms are also based on the constructions of Bellare and Neven [BN06] as discussed in Appendix G. We will describe each module in the following and discuss how they work and lead to the proof. First we will describe Sim KT , Frk KT , and Cal KT algorithms, which are used to construct the algorithm for solving a given P KT problem instance. After a discussion on the success probability of our solver, we will proceed to introduce our second set of algorithms Sim SS , Frk SS , and Cal SS , which are used to construct the algorithm for solving a given P SS problem instance. We will denote the random oracles used in the signature scheme by H SS and the one used in the Fiat-Shamir transform to build a signature of knowledge by H FS .
Let us first set some notations. One can see easily from Figures 9 and 2 and our construction that our designated signatures will be in the formσ = (σ pre , δ), where
Furthermore, we have
Also note that, following our proof of knowledge notation convention, the notation
Sec s =σ pre , Sec v = sk v , P ub s = (pk s , m,σ aux ) , and P ub v = pk v .
We will use the above notation throughout the proof.
Algorithm Sim KT gets a P KT instance Ins and a q-tuple (h 1 , . . . , h q ) as input. It first runs the key generation algorithm of the corresponding signature to obtain a key pair (sk s , pk s ). Then Sim KT runs A with inputs pk s and pk v = Ins. Note that, as we mentioned before, one can see the problem instance Ins as a public key pk v , for which we are trying to find the solution Sol, i.e. corresponding secret key sk v . During its run, A will ask H SS , H FS , and Sign oracle queries. Sim KT simulates the answers as follows:
• answers H SS queries randomly and records the answers.
• answers H FS queries by taking elements of the q-tuple (h 1 , . . . , h q ) consecutively, i.e. answers the first query with h 1 , the second with h 2 and so on.
• answers Sign queries by running the Sign algorithm of the signature scheme. Note that the signing key sk s is known to Sim KT , so there is no need to simulate the signatures.
At last, A outputs a DV-forgery (m,σ), whereσ = (σ aux , δ m,σ) ). In the case that the adversary has not been successful or no matching index J is found, Sim KT outputs (0, ε).
Algorithm Frk KT takes as input a P KT instance Ins. It is defined as the Bellare-Neven forker algorithm in Appendix G, with input Ins and access to algorithm Sim KT , i.e. using the Bellare-Neven notation
Frk KT outputs either (1, (m,σ) , (m ,σ )) or (0, ε, ε), depending on whether the forking has been successful or not. Note that a successful forking implies same Jth H FS oracle query and different corresponding answers. Since queries are of the form (P ub s , P ub v ) (Cmt s , Cmt v ), where P ub s = (pk s , m,σ aux ), the message m is also part of the Jth query and thus is the same for the two runs of the forked algorithm Sim KT , hence m = m . Therefore, from now on, we will use m instead of m .
Algorithm Cal KT takes as input a P KT instance Ins. It first runs Frk KT on the same input Ins and obtains either (1, (m,σ) , (m,σ )) or (0, ε, ε). Receiving the former means that forking by Frk KT has been successful, i.e. J = J and h J = h J according to the general Forking Lemma. Note that h J and h J are the two responses to the Jth H FS oracle queries in the two runs of the forked algorithm Sim KT . Thus h J = Chl = Chl s + Chl v and h J = Chl = Chl s + Chl v . Hence we have the following event:
Now, if Chl v = Chl v , then Cal KT will simply run the extraction algorithm for the protocol for proof of knowledge of the verifier's secret key and get a sk v s.t. Pair (pk v , sk v ). Cal KT outputs Sol = sk v as the solution to the P KT problem instance Ins. If Chl v = Chl v , Cal KT declares failure and halts.
A graphical depiction of how modules are wired to interact in our solver is shown in Figure 4 . Note that, again, random oracle queries are not shown in the figure. Let us denote by Slv KT our solver, i.e. the combination of all our modules: Cal KT , Frk KT , and the two instances of Sim KT wired together as in Figure 4 .
Let us calculate the probability that our solver is successful in solving the P KT problem instance Ins. We define the success probabilities for Sim KT and Frk KT similar to acc and f rk, respectively, in the general Forking Lemma (see Appendix G), i.e.
• Adv Sim KT (A) (k) is defined as the probability that Sim KT 's first output is not zero, given A, a random problem instance of size k, and random choices of h 1 , . . . , h q , and
• Adv Frk KT (Sim KT ) (k) is defined as the probability that Frk KT 's first output is one, given Sim KT and a random problem instance of size k.
(pk s , pk v )
Figure 4: Mechanism of the proof Now we observe that Sim KT succeeds if A succeeds in forging and the forgery uses a queried hash. We know that the probability that A succeeds without using a queried hash is at most one over the size of the challenge space. Thus we have
On the other hand, we have Bellare and Neven's General Forking Lemma which gives us a lower bound for the success probability of the forker, i.e. Frk KT , based on the success probability of the simulator, i.e. Sim KT . Thus we will have
where q is the maximum number of H FS queries A makes. We also see that Cal KT is successful if Frk KT succeeds and Chl v = Chl v . So we get the following:
Combining the three equations above, and applying the fact that Frk KT succeeds iff E happens, we can compute the overall probability of success of our solver in solving P KT as follows:
Assuming that the size of the challenge space is super-logarithmic in the security parameter and the number of queries the adversary asks is polynomially-bounded in the security parameter, we can neglect the two fractions with |ChSp| as denominator and simplify the above equation as follows:
Now we describe the three algorithms Sim SS , Frk SS , and Cal SS for solving an instance Ins of the underlying problem of the signature scheme P SS . These modules are again wired together as shown in Figure 4 , changing all the indexes from KT to SS.
Algorithm Sim SS gets an instance Ins of the problem P SS and a q-tuple (h 1 , . . . , h q ) as input. It first runs the corresponding verifier key generation algorithm KeyGen to obtain a key pair (sk v , pk v ). Then Sim SS runs the simulator algorithm Sim of the signature scheme SS on input Ins to get a public key pk s for the signature scheme. It then runs A on input (pk s , pk v ). A will ask H SS , H FS , and Sign oracle queries. Sim SS responds as follows:
• forwards all H SS and Sign oracle queries to the signature simulator Sim and relays the answers given by Sim back to A.
• answers H FS queries with the q-tuple it is provided with, i.e. answers the first query with h 1 , the second with h 2 and so on.
If Sim succeeds in simulating the H SS and Sign oracle queries, at last A outputs a DV-forgery (m,σ). Sim SS checks whether or not the adversary has been successful in forging, i.e. checks whether or not the message is new and the DV-forgery is valid by running the DVer algorithm. If (m,σ) passes both tests, Sim SS looks up the index J s.t. h J = Chl s + Chl v and outputs (J, (m,σ) ). In the case that either Sim fails, the adversary fails in forging a valid forgery, or no matching index J is found, Sim SS outputs (0, ε).
Algorithm Frk SS takes as input an instance Ins of the problem P SS . It is defined as the Bellare-Neven forker algorithm, with input Ins and access to algorithm Sim SS , i.e.
Frk SS outputs either (1, (m,σ) , (m ,σ )) or (0, ε, ε). Note that, with a similar reasoning as before, m = m .
Algorithm Cal SS takes as input an instance Ins of the problem P SS . It runs Frk SS on the same input and obtains either (1, (m,σ) , (m,σ )) or (0, ε, ε). Again, receiving the former means that forking by Frk SS has been successful, i.e. J = J and h J = h J . Hence we have the same event E as defined in Equation 1. Now, if Chl s = Chl s , then Cal SS will simply run the extraction algorithm for the protocol for proof of knowledge ofσ pre and get aσ pre s.t.
Valid pk s , m, (σ aux ,σ pre ) v . Then it runs the corresponding Retrieve algorithm on input (σ aux ,σ pre ) and gets a valid σ. Now, Cal SS feeds (m, σ) to the solution calculator algorithm Cal of the signature scheme SS and gets the solution Sol for the problem instance Ins of the problem P SS if Cal is successful. If either Chl s = Chl s or Cal fails, Cal SS declares failure and halts.
Let us calculate the probability that our solver is successful in solving the P SS problem instance Ins. We can define the success probability for Sim SS and Frk SS similar to that of Sim KT and Frk KT . Notice that Sim SS succeeds if Sim succeeds in simulating, A succeeds in forging, and the forgery uses a queried hash. Thus, with similar reasonings as before, the success probability of Sim SS can be finally written as
Furthermore, for the success probability of the forker algorithm Frk SS , a similar equation to the one we had in the first part of the proof holds, i.e.
where q is the maximum number of H FS queries made by A. We also see that Cal SS is successful if Frk SS succeeds in forking, Chl v = Chl v , and Cal succeeds in solving the problem instance Ins. Now let us define the following event:
In case of event F, a valid signature σ on the message m can be computed. The probability of obtaining such a signature can be written as
Now, using the notation defined in Appendix C.2, for non-FL-based signatures, we will have the following:
Combining the above equations and with a similar reasoning that lead us to Equation 2 plus the fact that E happens iff Frk SS succeeds, we get the following for overall probability of success of our solver in solving P SS for non-FL-based signatures:
where we also have exploited the fact that Adv Sim(A) (k) ≤ 1 to change the last numerator from Adv Sim(A) (k) + q to 1 + q. Similarly, assuming that the size of the challenge space is super-logarithmic, the number of queries the adversary asks is polynomially-bounded, and Adv Sim(A) (k) is noticeable in the security parameter, we can simplify the above equation as follows:
Combining Equations 2 and 3 and applying the fact that
we will get the following result for non-FL-based schemes:
Thus, as long as the adversary A has a good advantage of forging, we will be able to solve at least one of the problem instances of P KT or P SS with a good probability. This completes the proof for non-FL-based signatures.
On the other hand, for the FL-based signatures, since another forking is performed to get two valid signatures, we get the following:
where R H SS is the range of the hash function H SS . Again with a similar reasoning, assuming that the size of the challenge space and the size of R H SS are both super-logarithmic, the number of queries the adversary asks is polynomially-bounded, and Adv Sim(A) (k) is noticeable in the security parameter, we will get the following final result for overall probability of success of our solver in solving P SS for FL-based signatures:
Similarly, combining Equations 2 and 4, we will get the following result for FL-based schemes:
which again, guarantees a lower band for the probability that our solvers are able to solve at least one of the two instances of respectively the prroblems P KT and P SS . This completes the proof for FL-based signatures.
B Proof Sketch of Theorem 4
Proof sketch. We will prove that the interactive version of our IBS scheme, denoted by GIBI, is an identity-based identification scheme secure against impersonation under passive attacks (imp-pa in the sense of [BNN04] ). This will complete the proof since Bellare et al. have shown that any imp-pa-secure IBI is transformed via Fiat-Shamir to a id-euf-cma-secure IBS scheme [BNN04] .
To prove imp-pa security we need to be able to respond to two types of oracle queries: corruption oracle and conversation oracle queries. For the former, a user secret key for the given identity must be simulated and for the latter, a transcript of the interaction between a user with a given identity and a verifier. User secret keys can be simulated via the simulation algorithm for the signature scheme, since user secret keys are simply signatures on user identities. Transcripts of the interaction between a user with a given identity and a verifier can be simulated via first simulating theσ aux and then simulating a transcript for the proof of knowledge of theσ pre corresponding to the master public key, the identity, andσ aux .
At last, the successful impersonator can be used to extract two transcripts with the sameσ aux and commitment message and two different challenges and responses to them. This will allow first computing theσ pre and then, knowing bothσ aux andσ pre , computing a forgery for the signature scheme which, in turn, will be given to the solution calculator algorithm to compute the solution to the given instance of the underlying problem P SS .
Given an instance of the underlying problem P SS , we will run the Sim algorithm on this input. Sim will give us a pk that we will relay to the adversary as the master public key. The adversary then will start to ask two types of oracle queries: corruption oracle queries and conversation oracle queries. On a corruption oracle query id, we will forward id as a signing query to Sim and get the signature σ on it and then forward it along with the master public key and the input id as the response to the query id (i.e. the user secret key corresponding to id) to the adversary. On a conversation query id, we will run the AuxSim algorithm on input the master public key and id and get a simulatedσ aux . Then we will run the TrSim algorithm for the protocol for proof of knowledge of σ pre on input (mpk, id,σ aux ) to get a transcript T r = (Cmt, Chl, Rsp) for that protocol. Then we will give the adversary the conversation ((Cmt,σ aux ) , Chl, Rsp) as the response to the query id. For the signature schemes that use a random oracle in their construction, the adversary will ask H SS queries as well. These queries are also relayed to Sim algorithm and the response is relayed back to the adversary.
At last, the adversary decides that the first phase is over and outputs a target identity id * . We will keep answering the queries as before in the second phase. The adversary will be able to prove knowledge of the user secret key corresponding to id * at this stage. Rewinding the adversary and asking for a new challenge will give us two transcripts with the same commitment andσ * aux and different challenges and their respective responses. We will be able to extract aσ * pre corresponding toσ * aux from the same commitment, different challenges, and their respective responses then, and at last run the Retrieve algorithm on input the master public key, id * , and the pair σ * aux ,σ * pre to get a signature σ * on the identity id * . We will finally run the Cal algorithm on input σ * to get the solution to the problem instance.
Let us compute the probability that we will be successful in solving the underlying problem instance. Let us denote the probability that we are able to successfully simulate the environment for the adversary and the adversary will give us a suitable forgery by acc. With a similar reasoning to the proof of Theorem 1, we will get
Now, applying the Reset Lemma of Bellare and Palacio [BP02] we will get the success probability of computing two suitable transcripts as follows
Furthermore, again with a similar reasoning to the proof of Theorem 1, we will be able to calculate the probability that our solution calculator mathsf Cal SS will be successful in solving the instance of the problem P SS as the following for non-FL-based schemes:
Adv
Combining the above equations, we will get the following final result for the success probability of our solver Slv of P SS problem instances for non-FL-based schemes:
This completes the proof for non-FL-based signature schemes.
Furthermore, for FL-based signatures, the probability that the solution calculator will be successful in solving the instance of the problem P SS can be written as the following:
Thus the overall success probability of the solver will be calculated as follows for FL-based signature schemes:
This completes the proof for FL-based signatures.
C More on Classes K and C C.1 Some Key Types in the Class K There are quite a few different types of key pairs used in cryptographic schemes. Three of the simplest and most popular types are RSA-type, GQ-type, and DL-type key pairs. The key generation algorithms for these types of keys are shown in Figure 5 . The RSAGen and DLGen algorithms are respectively the prime exponent RSA parameter generator and the DL parameter generator algorithms that generate system parameters with respect to the security parameter taken as input.
return (pk, sk) [CM07] shows that the knowledge of the private exponent is equivalent to the knowledge of the factorization of N . Thus, instead of proving knowledge of d, one can use the existing Σ protocols for proof of knowledge of the factorization of N , for example the protocols by Poupard and Stern [PS00b] . Therefore, RSA keys belong to K.
The underlying problem of GQ and DL key types are the RSA and DL problems, respectively. Knowledge of the secret key corresponding to a public key for these two types of keys can be proved via GQ and Schnorr protocols, respectively, which are both Σ protocols. So these two types of keys also belong to K.
C.2 On Simulatability of Signature Schemes
We require that there exists a pair of algorithms, Sim and Cal, such that given an instance Ins of the underlying hard problem P SS , Sim is able to simulate a public key for the signature scheme and signatures for arbitrary chosen messages with a noticeable probability, and given a pair (resp. two pairs) consisting of a new message and a signature (resp. two signatures) on the message, valid with respect to the simulated public key, Cal is able to calculate a solution Sol to the problem instance with a noticeable probability.
Intuitively, this property requires that it is possible to simulate the public key and signatures for chosen messages for the signature scheme, without knowledge of the secret key, with a sufficiently good probability, in a way that a forgery enables us to solve an instance of a hard problem. This simulation might take place in the Random Oracle Model though. Proofs of unforgeability for most of the signature schemes, are constructed in a folklore standard way by first simulating the attack environment for the adversary and then using the adversary's forgery to solve a hard problem. These two are the algorithms we are looking for. Note that for a proof in the ROM, the simulator must also answer A's random oracle queries as well as its signing oracle queries.
Now consider two types of signatures depending on whether or not their security proof is based on the Forking Lemma. If the security proof of SS is not based on Forking Lemma (non-FL-based signature from now on), then only one forgery is enough for the Cal algorithm to compute the solution Sol. However, if the security proof of SS is based on Forking Lemma (FL-based signature from now on), then Cal will need two signatures on the same message to be able to calculate the solution to the hard problem. Let us denote by by Adv Sim(A) (k) the probability that the Sim succeeds in simulating the attack environment for A and gets a suitable forgery (definition of suitable is case-dependent). Let us also denote by Adv Cal(Sim) (k) the probability that given one (respectively two for FL-based schemes) valid signature(s) on a message, Cal succeeds in computing the solution Sol for the problem instance Ins given to Sim.
A depiction of the mechanism of the proof for these two types of schemes is shown in Figure 6 . Note that random oracle queries are not shown in this figure. As one can follow the order of events in Figure 6 from top to bottom, for a non-FL-based scheme, first the problem instance Ins is given to Cal as input. The public key pk and answers σ i to signing oracle queries m i are then simulated by Sim. The forgery (m, σ) which is output by the adversary A is then used by Cal to calculate a solution Sol for the problem instance. For FL-based schemes, a forker algorithm Frk is introduced which runs the simulator and the adversary two times, ordering the simulator to use different values as responses to the adversary's random oracle queries each time. Then the two signatures are given to the Cal that calculates and outputs Sol. For more details, see the General Forking Lemma in Appendix G. Let us also denote by Slv the combination of Cal and Sim for the case of non-FL-based signatures and the combination of Cal, Frk, and the two instances of Sim for the case of FL-based signatures. Using the notation defined above, we will have the following results respectively for the non-FL-based and FL-based schemes:
C.3 Some Signatures in the Class C RSA-FDH Signature: The Full-Domain Hash RSA signature scheme was proposed and proved secure by Bellare and Rogaway [BR96] . The key pairs are of the forms pk = (N, e) and sk = d, where ed = 1 mod ϕ (N ) and N is an RSA modulus. A valid signature σ satisfies the verification equation σ e = H (m) mod N . The signature is the pre-image itself and no auxiliary informationσ aux is required to carry out the proof, thus we have the following algorithms:
(ε, σ) ← Convert (pk, m, σ) andσ pre ← Retrieve (pk, m,σ) .
Simulation ofσ aux = ε is trivial. The verification equation suggests the following one-way function and image:
f (x) = x e mod N and I = H (m) .
Hence,σ pre = σ is the eth RSA root of I and knowledge ofσ pre can be proved via the GQ protocol [GQ88] which is a Σ protocol. Thus, RSA-FDH has the first property.
One can easily see that the second property also holds for RSA-FDH. The security proof by Coron [Cor00] can be easily seen to have two separable parts as bellow: given an RSA problem instance Ins = (N, e, X), the simulator simulates the public key as pk s = (N, e, X), answers to hash queries of m i as either X · r e i mod N or r e i mod N for a random r i , and answers to sign queries on m i as r i . Given a forgery (m * , σ * ), the simulator first finds the corresponding i so that m i = m * and then checks whether or not m * hash query has been answered by X · r e i mod N or not and sends the forgery to the solution calculator if positive. The solution calculator calculates Sol = σ * /r i mod N as the solution to Ins. According to [Cor00] the above simulator will be successful in simulating and getting a suitable forgery with probability 1 exp(1)·qs and the solution calculator will be successful in solving the problem instance with probability 1, given a suitable forgery.
Sinceσ aux = r is uniformly distributed, it can be simulated by just picking a uniformly random element of Z Therefore, we will have the following one-way function and image:
f (x) = e (g, g)
Hence,σ pre is the discrete logarithm of I in base e (g, g) and knowledge ofσ pre can be proved via the Schnorr protocol [Sch91] which is a Σ protocol. Thus, BB has the first property. One can examine that the second property also holds for BB (see [BB04] ).
Cramer-Shoup Signature: The Cramer-Shoup signature was proposed and proved secure by Cramer and Shoup [CS00] . The key pairs are of the forms pk = (n, h, x, e ) and sk = (p, q), where n = pq is an RSA modulus, h and x are random quadratic residues mod n, and e is prime. A signature is of the form σ = (e, y, y ) for a random prime e and a random quadratic residue y . A valid signature satisfies the equation
mod n .
Signatures can be converted and retrieved trivially as follows:
((e, y ) , y) ← Convert (pk, m, σ) and (e, y, y ) ← Retrieve (pk, m, ((e, y ) , y)) .
Since both e and y are chosen randomly,σ aux = (e, y ) is uniformly distributed and can be simulated by just picking two uniformly random elements from the corresponding sets. The verification equation can be rewritten asσ
mod n, whereσ pre = y .
Therefore, we will have the following one-way function and image:
.
Hence,σ pre is the eth RSA root of I mod n and knowledge ofσ pre can be proved via the GQ protocol [GQ88] which is a Σ protocol. Thus, Cramer-Shoup has the first property. One can examine that the second property also holds for the scheme (see [CS00] ).
Camenisch-Lysyanskaya-02 Signature: The CL02 signature was proposed and proved secure by Camenisch and Lysyanskaya [CL02] . The key pairs are of the forms pk = (n, a, b, c) and sk = (p, q), where n = pq is an RSA modulus and a, b, and c are random quadratic residues mod n. A signature is of the form σ = (e, s, v) for a random prime e and a random s. A valid signature satisfies the equation
((e, s) , v) ← Convert (pk, m, σ) and (e, s, v) ← Retrieve (pk, m, ((e, s) , v)) .
Since both e and s are chosen randomly,σ aux = (e, s) is uniformly distributed and can be simulated by just picking two uniformly random elements from the corresponding sets. The verification equation suggests the following one-way function and image:
f (x) = x e and I = a H(m) · b s · c .
Hence,σ pre = v is the eth RSA root of I mod n and knowledge ofσ pre can be proved via the GQ protocol [GQ88] which is a Σ protocol. Thus, CL02 has the first property. One can examine that the second property also holds for the scheme (see [CL02] ).
Camenisch-Lysyanskaya-04 Signature: The CL04 signature was proposed and proved secure by Camenisch and Lysyanskaya [CL04] . The key pairs are of the forms pk = (q, G, G , g, g , e, X, Y ) and sk = (x, y), where G = g and G = g are two groups of prime size q, e : G × G → G is a pairing, X = g x , and Y = g y . A signature is of the form σ = (a, b, c) for a random a ∈ G and a valid signature satisfies the equations e (a, Y ) = e (g, b) and e (X, a) · [e (X, b)] H(m) = e (g, c) .
A UDVS is said to be dv-euf-cma-secure if no poly-time attacker can get an advantage non-negligible in k, in a dv-euf-cma attack against it.
ID-Unforgeability for IBS Schemes. We recall Bellare and Neven's definition of IBS security [BNN04] against existential unforgeability under a chosen message and identity attack, denoted here by id-euf-cmasecurity. The adversary has the ability to initialize and corrupt users beside its ability to obtain signatures on chosen messages and identities. Formally, an experiment with corresponding initialization oracle Init, signing oracle Sign, and corruption oracle Corr is defined as in Figure 8 . A UDVS is said to be id-euf-cma-secure if no poly-time attacker can get an advantage non-negligible in k, in an id-euf-cma attack against it.
E Example GUDVS Construction
RSA-based UDVS assuming RSA-FDH signature scheme for the signer and registered GQ-type public key for the verifier:
• CPGen simply returns 1 k as the common parameter.
• VKeyGen is defined as key generation for the GQ protocol, i.e. • SKeyGen, Sign and PVer are defined as in RSA-FDH signature, i.e.
sk s = d, pk s = (N s , e s ) , and σ = H 1 (m) d .
• To designate, the signature-holder calculates the DV-signature as follows: Sec 2 ← Ext 2 (P ub 2 , T r 2 , T r 2 ) return (Sec 1 , Sec 2 ) Figure 10 : Transcript simulation and extraction algorithms for the construction in Figure 9 Cramer et al's results can be applied to both the GQ and the Schnorr protocols for proving RSA roots and discrete logarithms, respectively. This means that a WI proof of disjunctive knowledge of two RSA roots, i.e. Example Proving knowledge of an x 1 s.t. x e 1 = X 1 mod N or an x 2 s.t. g x2 = X 2 mod p, i.e.
PoK {(x 1 ∨ x 2 ) : x e 1 = X 1 mod N , g x2 = X 2 mod p } can be constructed as follows. The public keys of the two systems are denoted by pk 1 = (N, e, X 1 ) and pk 2 = (p, g, X 2 ). There are, of course, two different descriptions of the prover's algorithm, based on whether P knows x 1 or x 2 . Let us define pk = (pk 1 , pk 2 ). In the following, we give the two descriptions: 
As one can see, the verifiers' sides of the protocols are the same. In fact, from the verifier's perspective, both protocols are the same and he cannot find out if the prover knows x 1 or x 2 .
G Bellare and Neven's General Forking Lemma
Lemma 3 Let q ≥ 1 and H be a set such that |H| ≥ 2. Let A be a randomized algorithm that has two outputs, the first of which is an integer in {0, 1, . . . , q}. Let also Coins be the set of all possible coins for A. We define the accepting probability of A with respect to an input generator IG as follows acc = Pr J ≥ 1 : x ← IG; h 1 , . . . , h q $ ← H; (J, σ) ← A (x, h 1 , . . . , h q ) .
